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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, public outcry over the Watergate scandal prompted Congress to 
enact sweeping amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).1 
Among other things, the FECA amendments established limits on 
contributions to candidates, imposed an overall cap on campaign expenditures, 
and created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to enforce federal 
campaign finance law.2 In the landmark 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Supreme Court struck down the expenditure caps but upheld the other key 
features of the Act.3 Federal campaign finance law has been based on a model 
of low contribution limits and unlimited expenditures ever since. 
                                                                                                                     
  Professor of Law, Drake University; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2005; Ph.D. in 
History, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002; M.A., Louisiana State University, 1996; 
B.A., University of Minnesota, 1993. My thanks to Ned Foley and the editors of the Ohio 
State Law Journal for inviting me to participate in this Symposium. All opinions expressed 
herein and all errors of fact and interpretation are my responsibility alone. This Article is 
part of a book that I am writing on the history of campaign finance law; therefore, I very 
much welcome reader comments and criticism. I can be reached at 
anthony.gaughan@drake.edu.  
 1 FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 2, 7–8 (1992) (observing that the 
1974 amendments were “the immediate consequence of Watergate and the misdeeds of 
Richard Nixon’s Committee to Reelect the President”). 
 2 Id. at 9–10. 
 3 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam). 
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The United States now has forty years of experience with the post-
Watergate campaign finance system. That long experience provides sufficient 
evidence to ask and answer a fundamental question: Are we better off today 
than we were before the Watergate era campaign finance reforms?  
The thesis of this Article is that the answer to that question is no. In fact, 
in many respects, the current system is worse than that which prevailed before 
Watergate. And although many place the blame on the 2010 case of Citizens 
United v. FEC,4 which cleared the way for the rise of Super PACs,5 most of 
the failings in the American campaign finance system were apparent long 
before Citizens United.  
The root of the problem is Buckley itself. The Buckley decision created a 
hybrid campaign finance system, a Frankenstein monster of mismatched laws, 
some that regulated campaign contributions and others that deregulated them. 
As a consequence of Buckley, the Watergate reforms not only failed to limit 
the influence of money in politics, they had the paradoxical effect of making 
fundraising more important than ever. By establishing contribution limits 
without a corresponding expenditure cap, federal campaign finance law forces 
members of Congress to spend much of their work week raising huge amounts 
of money in ludicrously small increments. The time and energy that 
officeholders devote to fundraising has fundamentally undermined the 
legislative process. The result is a deeply dysfunctional system that gives the 
United States the worst consequences of regulation and deregulation without 
the benefits of either.  
Political and constitutional realities prevent the nation’s elected officials 
from addressing the problem. Although Congress could adopt deregulation on 
its own without court intervention, the public’s overwhelming support for 
campaign finance regulation6 makes legislative deregulation a political 
nonstarter. Conversely, the Supreme Court has barred Congress from acting on 
popular support for comprehensive reform of the system. The reason is the 
Buckley ruling prohibits Congress from establishing limits on overall 
campaign spending, such as those adopted years ago by most other western 
                                                                                                                     
 4 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“No sufficient governmental 
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”). 
 5 See generally R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042, SUPER PACS IN 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2013) (providing 
background on super PACs). 
 6 Sarah Dutton et al., Poll: Americans Say Money Has Too Much Influence in 
Campaigns, CBS NEWS (June 2, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-americans-say-
money-has-too-much-influence-in-campaigns/ [https://perma.cc/3CWW-V5VU] (finding that 
84% of Americans think money has too much influence on political campaigns); Greg 
Stohr, Bloomberg Poll: Americans Want Supreme Court to Turn off Political Spending 
Spigot, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-09-
28/bloomberg-poll-americans-want-supreme-court-to-turn-off-political-spending-spigot 
[https://perma.cc/HGC7-TLXC] (finding that 78% of Americans oppose the Supreme 
Court’s Citizens United ruling). 
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democracies.7 And while a constitutional amendment overturning Buckley is a 
theoretical possibility, the immense practical challenge of amending the 
Constitution renders it an unrealistic option for campaign finance reform.8 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court occupies the only branch of government 
in a position to end the constitutional stalemate that has paralyzed the 
American campaign finance system for forty years. The most reasonable and 
practical long-term solution is for the Supreme Court to either permit 
comprehensive campaign finance regulation or, conversely, require sweeping 
deregulation.9 To resolve the deadlock, the Justices must finally provide a 
clear and definitive answer to the central question in American campaign 
finance law: does the First Amendment permit broad and all-encompassing 
campaign finance regulations, or does it instead require full deregulation?  
This Article concludes that, contrary to the polarizing rhetoric that 
surrounds the national debate over campaign finance law, the historical record 
indicates that both reformers and their opponents offer reasonable policy 
alternatives to the dysfunctional system that prevails today. For example, 
twentieth-century political history at the federal level and ongoing experience 
at the state level demonstrate that a deregulated campaign finance system does 
not lead inevitably or necessarily to plutocracy. At the same rate, however, 
Canada’s experience with expenditure caps shows that robust political debate 
and high levels of incumbent turnover are possible even within a 
comprehensively regulated campaign finance environment. The bottom line is 
either approach—comprehensive regulation or sweeping deregulation—is 
preferable to the hybrid campaign finance system that governs American 
elections today. 
II. A THIRD-RATE BURGLARY 
The modern history of American campaign finance law began in the early 
morning darkness of June 17, 1972. Shortly after midnight, five burglars broke 
into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters at the Watergate 
                                                                                                                     
 7 See D.R. Piccio, Northern, Western and Southern Europe, in FUNDING OF 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 207, 208–09 (Elin Falguera et al. eds., 
2014). 
 8 See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 166 (2016) [hereinafter 
HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED]; Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches 
(and One Right One) to Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 29 
(2014); Eric Posner, The U.S. Constitution Is Impossible to Amend, SLATE (May 5, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/amending_the_c
onstitution_is_much_too_hard_blame_the_founders.html [https://perma.cc/UMJ9-E2P7].  
 9 On the central role of the Supreme Court in determining the future of campaign 
finance reform, see HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 8, at 176–89. 
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Office Complex.10 The burglary was foiled by an alert security guard who 
discovered evidence of the break-in while the burglars were still inside the 
building.11 When metropolitan police officers arrived at the Watergate and 
entered the DNC offices, the burglars surrendered without incident.12  
But as the arresting officers later testified, the police immediately 
recognized that this was “a little bigger than the average burglary.”13 Indeed, 
there was nothing ordinary about the Watergate burglars. They wore business 
suits and blue latex surgical gloves.14 Even more intriguing was what they 
carried with them: electronic eavesdropping devices, cameras, a walkie-talkie, 
burglary tools, and a police radio scanner.15 But the most important and 
revealing clue was money. Police found $1,700 in cash on the burglars and 
another $3,500 in cash in the burglars’ rooms at the Watergate Hotel.16 A large 
portion of the cash was in the form of $100 bills with serial numbers in 
sequential order.17  
Justice Department investigators and Washington reporters recognized that 
the key to solving the riddle of Watergate was to “follow the money.”18 
Although the Nixon Administration downplayed Watergate’s significance by 
ridiculing it as a “third-rate burglary,”19 the FBI traced the cash to a Miami 
bank account that the President’s campaign committee had used to launder 
thousands of dollars in secret and illegal contributions.20 The money thus 
directly tied the President’s reelection campaign to the Watergate burglary.21  
The Watergate investigation reached the Oval Office in the spring of 1973. 
After the Senate established a special committee to investigate election 
                                                                                                                     
 10 FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE 
FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 132–37 (1994); J. ANTHONY LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE 
UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS 279 (1977). 
 11 EMERY, supra note 10, at 132–33. 
 12 Id. at 135–36. 
 13 LUKAS, supra note 10, at 287. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id.; KEITH W. OLSON, WATERGATE: THE PRESIDENTIAL SCANDAL THAT SHOOK 
AMERICA 45 (2003); BARRY SUSSMAN, THE GREAT COVER-UP: NIXON AND THE SCANDAL 
OF WATERGATE 9 (2010). 
 16 LUKAS, supra note 10, at 287. 
 17 JOHN W. DEAN, THE NIXON DEFENSE: WHAT HE KNEW AND WHEN HE KNEW IT 5 
(2014); EMERY, supra note 10, at 148; LUKAS, supra note 10, at 287; OLSON, supra note 
15, at 45; SUSSMAN, supra note 15, at 11, 60. 
 18 On the phrase “follow the money,” see RALPH KEYES, THE QUOTE VERIFIER: WHO 
SAID WHAT, WHERE, AND WHEN 65–66 (2006), and BOB WOODWARD, THE SECRET MAN: 
THE STORY OF WATERGATE’S DEEP THROAT 70–71 (2005).  
 19 Watergate and the White House: The ‘Third-Rate Burglary’ that Toppled a 
President, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articl 
es/2014/08/08/watergate-and-the-white-house-the-third-rate-burglary-that-toppled-a-president 
[https://perma.cc/V8C6-DY7V]. 
 20 HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1972 ELECTION 460–61 (1976); EMERY, 
supra note 10, at 111–12, 188. 
 21 EMERY, supra note 10, at 188. 
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practices during the 1972 campaign, John Dean, the White House Counsel, 
and Jeb Stuart Magruder, the deputy director of the President’s reelection 
campaign, began to cooperate with government investigators.22 Dean revealed 
that the President and his top aides had participated in an illicit effort to 
conceal the burglars’ ties to the Administration.23 Later that summer, White 
House staffer Alexander Butterfield disclosed to Senate investigators the 
existence of an Oval Office audiotaping system.24 The investigation triggered 
a constitutional crisis when President Nixon defied congressional and judicial 
subpoenas by refusing to turn over Watergate-related audiotapes.25 He claimed 
that the doctrine of executive privilege empowered him to withhold the tapes 
from disclosure to Congress or the courts.26 
The Watergate scandal reached a dramatic climax in July 1974 when the 
Supreme Court ruled against the President.27 Nixon knew the ruling spelled his 
political doom because the tapes contained evidence of his personal 
involvement in the cover-up.28 Faced with the certainty of impeachment in the 
House and conviction in the Senate, Nixon resigned the presidency on August 
9, 1974.29 
Watergate remains today the most famous and momentous political 
scandal in American history. It ended a presidency and shook the United 
States government to its foundations. But Watergate also represents a key 
turning point in campaign finance law. Forty years after Nixon’s resignation, 
the admonition to “follow the money” is useful for anyone seeking to 
understand Watergate’s impact on American election law.  
The Watergate scandal shined a light on dark secrets of the American 
campaign finance system.30 In 1972, the Nixon campaign spent what at the 
time was an unprecedented amount of $67 million,31 much of which the 
Administration failed to disclose publicly.32 Watergate investigators 
discovered that Nixon’s secret donations included $850,000 in illegal 
corporate campaign contributions.33 The companies that made the illegal 
contributions included some of the most prominent corporations in the 
country, such as American Airlines, Anheuser-Busch, 3M, Chrysler, Disney, 
                                                                                                                     
 22 OLSON, supra note 15, at 77. 
 23 SUSSMAN, supra note 15, at 228–30. 
 24 EMERY, supra note 10, at 367–69. 
 25 STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD 
NIXON 388–90, 510, 513–14 (1990). 
 26 THEODORE H. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 3–5, 255–
57 (1975).  
 27 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974). 
 28 OLSON, supra note 15, at 134.  
 29 BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 451 (1976). 
 30 DEAN, supra note 17, at 5–6; LUKAS, supra note 10, at 212; OLSON, supra note 15, 
at 45; SUSSMAN, supra note 15, at 9.  
 31 ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 78–79.  
 32 Id. at 49–54; EMERY, supra note 10, at 109. 
 33 ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 513; EMERY, supra note 10, at 110. 
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DuPont, Goodyear Tire, and Gulf Oil, among others.34 Watergate investigators 
learned that many corporations felt pressured by the Administration to make 
campaign contributions.35 George Spater, chairman of American Airlines, 
explained that his company gave to the Nixon campaign “in fear of what could 
happen if [donations] were not given.”36  
When Nixon’s crimes came to light, the Watergate scandal crystallized in 
the public mind the notion that campaign contributions were inherently 
corrupting.37 Former Delaware Senator John J. Williams reflected the public 
mood when he asserted that “the reprehensible, clandestine political acts 
connected with Watergate were financed and made possible by an excess of 
campaign donations, many of them secretly and illicitly obtained.”38 Likewise, 
during testimony before the Senate, Jeb Stuart Magruder blamed the presence 
of “[t]oo much money” in the Nixon campaign coffers as the ultimate cause of 
the Watergate break-in.39  
Even Richard Nixon himself recognized that Watergate had added critical 
momentum to the cause of campaign finance reform. In May 1973, as the 
Watergate scandal began to consume his Administration, Nixon expressed 
shock at the “recent disclosures of widespread abuses” during the 1972 
election.40 The President called for the creation of a nonpartisan commission 
to “examine the costs and financing of campaigns” and to find “ways in which 
the costs can be kept down and improper influence or influence-seeking 
through large campaign contributions can be ended.”41 Nixon declared that 
“sweeping” campaign finance reform was necessary “to restore the faith of the 
American people in the integrity of their political process.”42 
                                                                                                                     
 34 ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 513–30; 2 CONG. QUARTERLY INC., WATERGATE: 
CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS 187, 294 (1974); ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A 
HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 134–35 (2014). 
 35 Michael J. Malbin, Looking Back at the Future of Campaign Finance Reform: 
Interest Groups and American Elections, in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
FINANCING ELECTIONS IN THE 1980S, 232, 245–46 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES]. 
 36 120 CONG. REC. 26196 (1974) (extension of remarks of Hon. William J. Green 
(quoting George Spater)). 
 37 MUTCH, supra note 34, at 137–38; Julian E. Zelizer, Seeds of Cynicism: The 
Struggle over Campaign Finance, 1956–1974, in MONEY AND POLITICS 79, 99 (Paula 
Baker ed., 2002).  
 38 120 CONG. REC. 9270 (statement of Sen. John J. Williams).  
 39 Id. at 34387 (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey (quoting Jeb Stuart Magruder)). 
Two prominent political scientists agreed with Magruder’s assessment. See NELSON W. 
POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN 
ELECTORAL POLITICS 57 (6th ed. 1984). 
 40 Special Message to the Congress Proposing Establishment of a Nonpartisan 
Commission on Federal Election Reform, 1973 PUB. PAPERS 536 (May 16, 1973).  
 41 Remarks About Proposed Legislation to Establish a Nonpartisan Commission on 
Federal Election Reform, 1973 PUB. PAPERS 533 (May 16, 1973). 
 42 Id. at 535–36. 
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Needless to say, Nixon’s belated endorsement of reform lacked even a 
trace of sincerity. During his presidency, he blocked efforts to make 
significant changes in the campaign finance system.43 But President Nixon 
aided the cause of reform in one crucial respect: his fundraising practices 
created such intense public outrage that the stage was set for a new era in 
American campaign finance law.44 
III. THE WAR ON MONEY IN POLITICS BEGINS 
As the Watergate scandal brought down Nixon’s presidency, Congress 
took up the issue of how to reform federal campaign finance law. The 
Watergate era reform proposals were not the first to come before Congress. 
Throughout the twentieth century, reformers had attempted to reduce the 
influence of money on political campaigns, but they had little to show for their 
efforts.45 
The laws looked strict on paper. In 1907, Congress banned corporate 
contributions to candidates in federal elections.46 In 1910, Congress enacted 
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which required the national party 
committees and multistate committees to disclose the campaign contributions 
they received and the expenditures they made in House elections.47 In 
subsequent amendments to the FCPA, Congress established expenditure caps 
on Senate and House campaigns as well as on the national parties, imposed 
contribution limits on individual donations to federal candidates and political 
committees, increased disclosure requirements, and prohibited corporations 
and labor unions from engaging in independent political expenditures in 
federal elections.48  
The reforms failed in virtually every respect.49 As the historian Lewis 
Gould pointedly noted of the FCPA, “So many loopholes existed in the law 
that it soon became a mere formality to which few politicians paid more than 
                                                                                                                     
 43 RAYMOND J. LA RAJA, SMALL CHANGE: MONEY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 76 (2008); Richard L. Hasen, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. 
Valeo, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 345, 349–53 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew 
Koppelman eds., 2012).  
 44 MARIAN CURRINDER, MONEY IN THE HOUSE: CAMPAIGN FUNDS AND 
CONGRESSIONAL PARTY POLITICS 20 (2009); MUTCH, supra note 34, at 137–38; Zelizer, 
supra note 37, at 99. 
 45 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 45. 
 46 Id. at 50–51; MUTCH, supra note 34, at 48–51. 
 47 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 52; Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of 
Federal Campaign Finance Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 13–14 
(Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2005).  
 48 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010); LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 54–
55, 60–61; SORAUF, supra note 1, at 6; Corrado, supra note 47, at 14–17. 
 49 Hasen, supra note 43, at 348. 
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appropriate lip service.”50 Indeed, from 1910 to 1974 federal campaign finance 
law was honored more in the breach than in the observation.51 No agency had 
responsibility for regulating federal campaign finance laws.52 Although federal 
law required members to report campaign receipts and expenditures, Congress 
collected the information in haphazard fashion and concealed it from public 
view.53 As a result, candidates routinely failed to file disclosure reports and 
party and candidate committees perennially ignored expenditure limits.54 
Donations far in excess of federal contribution limits were commonplace.55 
Even when donors and candidates complied with the FCPA’s technical 
requirements, loopholes in the law made it easy to circumvent the contribution 
limits by donating to multiple committees that supported the same candidate.56 
A 1941 Justice Department investigation concluded that federal campaign 
finance law was “fatally defective” and “unenforceable.”57 The situation was 
no different a quarter century later. In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson bluntly 
observed that campaign finance laws were “[m]ore loophole than law, they 
invite evasion and circumvention.”58  
Accordingly, on the eve of Watergate, pressure began to build for 
Congress to take action.59 In 1971, Congress repealed the FCPA and enacted 
in its place the Federal Election Campaign Act.60 FECA eliminated the 
FCPA’s contribution and expenditure limits, replacing them with caps on 
media expenditures, enhanced public disclosure of fundraising and campaign 
                                                                                                                     
 50 LEWIS L. GOULD, THE MOST EXCLUSIVE CLUB: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN UNITED 
STATES SENATE 111 (2005).  
 51 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 54; SORAUF, supra note 1, at 5–6; Corrado, supra note 
47, at 15.  
 52 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 54–55. 
 53 Id. at 54–55, 66; see also THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: THE BUILDING OF 
DEMOCRACY 313 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 2004); SORAUF, supra note 1, at 6. 
 54 Corrado, supra note 47, at 15–17. 
 55 HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL 
REFORM 49 (2d ed. 1980); SORAUF, supra note 1, at 3–4; Corrado, supra note 47, at 15–17. 
 56 ROBIN KOLODNY, PURSUING MAJORITIES: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES 
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 127 (1998); LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 61, 130; Corrado, supra 
note 47, at 15. 
 57 Louise Overacker, Campaign Finance in the Presidential Election of 1940, 35 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 701, 725 (1941) (quoting Maurice M. Milligan, Special Assistant to the 
Attorney General).  
 58 STEVEN M. GILLON, “THAT’S NOT WHAT WE MEANT TO DO”: REFORM AND ITS 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 201 (2000) (quoting 
President Lyndon Johnson). 
 59 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 66–72; Corrado, supra note 47, at 19–20; Hasen, supra 
note 43, at 349–50. 
 60 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 72–75; SORAUF, supra note 1, at 7–9; Corrado, supra 
note 47, at 20–22. 
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spending, and limits on the amounts that candidates could contribute to their 
own campaigns.61  
But the 1971 version of FECA never got off the ground. Candidates and 
parties flouted the new law before it even went into effect. For example, 
during the five weeks between the FCPA’s expiration on February 29, 1972 
and FECA’s effective date of April 7, 1972, the Nixon Administration raised 
$11.4 million in secret contributions.62 After its implementation date, FECA 
did nothing to contain campaign costs as presidential election spending rose 
from $44 million in 1968 to $103 million in 1972.63  
Although FECA lacked teeth, the events of 1972 fundamentally 
transformed the political dynamics of the campaign finance debate.64 During 
the ’72 campaign, Nixon enjoyed a huge financial advantage over his 
Democratic challenger, George McGovern.65 The Nixon-McGovern race 
culminated a decade in which Democrats experienced growing fundraising 
problems even as they won Congressional elections.66 The Vietnam War and 
the civil rights movement67 profoundly divided the Democratic Party, with its 
divisions put on full display during the Party’s chaotic 1968 convention in 
Chicago.68 Those internal divisions undermined Democratic fundraising so 
severely that the national party was $9 million in debt even as Democrats 
maintained large majorities in the House and Senate.69 The possibility that 
Republicans could use their fundraising advantage to take control of Congress 
persuaded Democrats to support restrictions on the flow of campaign money.70  
The Watergate scandal thus broke at an ideal time for reformers. Public 
outrage at Nixon’s crimes generated enormous pressure on Republicans to 
accept comprehensive reform of the system.71 Newspapers throughout the 
country rallied to the cause of reform. Citing Watergate’s “sordid” revelations, 
the New York Times declared, “Now is the time for a full and fundamental 
cleansing of the nation’s outmoded, corrupt system of financing public 
                                                                                                                     
 61 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 72–75; MUTCH, supra note 34, at 130–31; Corrado, 
supra note 47, at 20–22. 
 62 ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 459. 
 63 Corrado, supra note 47, at 21–22. 
 64 MUTCH, supra note 34, at 133–34; JULIAN E. ZELIZER, ON CAPITOL HILL: THE 
STRUGGLE TO REFORM CONGRESS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1948–2000, at 117–21 (2004); 
Joel L. Fleishman, The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments: The 
Shortcomings of Good Intentions, 1975 DUKE L.J. 851, 852. 
 65 ALEXANDER, supra note 20, at 78–79. 
 66 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 66–75. 
 67 DAVID FARBER, CHICAGO ’68, at 94 (1988); LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 72. 
 68 LEWIS L. GOULD, 1968: THE ELECTION THAT CHANGED AMERICA 104–19 (2d ed. 
2010); RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING OF 
AMERICA 307–54 (2008). 
 69 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 69, 72. Frank Sorauf places the Democratic Party’s 
1968 campaign debt at $6 million in 1971. SORAUF, supra note 1, at 7. 
 70 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 66–75; SORAUF, supra note 1, at 7. 
 71 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 75. 
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elections with private money.”72 The Philadelphia Inquirer called for a 
“revolution” in campaign finance law to end “the need for money, in huge 
quantity, that corrupted the 1972 electoral process beyond the grimmest, most 
cynical limits of previous imagination.”73  
The reform groundswell finally forced Congress to act. In 1973 and 1974 
Congress debated amendments to FECA that would revolutionize federal 
election law.74 The proposed amendments included limits on contributions to 
candidates, an expenditure cap on congressional and presidential elections, 
public financing of congressional and presidential campaigns, and the creation 
of the Federal Election Commission to enforce the new laws.75  
Supporters of the FECA amendments argued that they would reduce 
corruption and restore public confidence in government. Senator Joe Biden 
warned that the “high cost of running, places even the most innocent candidate 
in the position of being in the pocket” of campaign contributors.76 
Emphasizing the importance of driving money out of politics, Senator Hubert 
Humphrey declared, “Big money, large private contributions, and the amount 
of money a politician can raise should not be permitted to continue as a key to 
election day success.”77 Senator Ted Kennedy asserted that campaign finance 
reform was “the most positive contribution Congress can make to end the 
crisis over Watergate, and restore the people’s shattered confidence in the 
integrity of their Government.”78 Others advocated reform in order to promote 
a more diverse Congress. “[W]e will never have a Congress that truly reflects 
the diversity of the American electorate as long as money dominates political 
campaigns,” insisted Representative Bella Abzug.79 “Congress will remain—
as it is—a predominantly segregated club of white-skinned, upper-middle-
class males as long as qualified candidates are precluded from seeking elective 
office solely because they lack personal wealth or access to the wealth of 
others.”80  
The reformers also emphasized the adverse impact fundraising had on the 
day-to-day activities of elected officials. Senator Humphrey declared that “[i]t 
is time we stopped making candidates for Federal office spend so much of 
their time, energy and ultimately their credibility, on the telephone calling 
friends or committees, meeting with people, and oftentimes begging for 
money.”81 Humphrey lamented that “[s]crounging for funds to bring your case 
to the electorate is a demeaning experience,” one that he viewed as “the most 
                                                                                                                     
 72 Editorial, The Time is Now, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1974, at 42. 
 73 120 CONG. REC. 26195 (1974). 
 74 LA RAJA, supra note 43, at 75–77. 
 75 Id. 
 76 119 CONG. REC. 25984 (1973) (statement of Sen. Joe Biden). 
 77 120 CONG. REC. 8453 (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey). 
 78 Id. at 8209 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy). 
 79 Id. at 27510 (statement of Rep. Bella Abzug). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 8453 (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey). 
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demanding, disgusting, depressing and disenchanting part of politics.”82 He 
concluded that the FECA amendments bill “gives us our best chance ever of 
cleaning up our politics.”83  
The drumbeat for reform did not receive universal acclaim. Critics in 
Congress and academia warned that the proposed amendments violated the 
First Amendment and would deny Congressional challengers access to 
sufficient campaign funds. For example, Yale Law Professor Ralph K. Winter 
argued that the proposed expenditure cap “sets a maximum on the political 
activities in which American citizens can engage.”84 He also condemned 
contribution limits as “an explicit restriction on political freedom” that 
“establishes a dangerous precedent” of government regulation of freedom of 
speech and association.85 Winter concluded that “[t]here is no room for price 
controls in the marketplace of ideas.”86 The leading Senate opponent of the 
1974 amendments was Senator James Buckley of New York.87 The 
Republican senator described the amendments as an act of “cynicism” that 
should be retitled the “Incumbent Protection Act of 1974.”88 Buckley warned 
of the practical effects of the proposed restrictions, asserting that “[t]he 
artificially low spending limits are demonstrably inadequate and will keep 
challengers from getting off the ground in House, Senate and, yes, Presidential 
races.”89 Buckley predicted that the Supreme Court would strike down both 
the proposed expenditure caps and the contribution limits on First Amendment 
grounds.90  
Crucially, however, the public supported the reform proposals. A 1973 
Harris Poll found that nearly 90% of Americans believed campaign spending 
was excessive and about 70% supported contribution limits.91 Most striking of 
all, a September 1973 Gallup Poll found that 65% of Americans supported 
public financing of federal campaigns and a complete ban on private 
contributions.92  
The steady drumbeat of new revelations about Nixon’s fundraising 
practices made support for reform irresistible in Congress.93 On August 8, 
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1974—one day before Nixon resigned the presidency—the House approved 
the FECA amendments by a vote of 355 to 48.94 Two months later, the Senate 
passed the FECA amendments by a margin of forty-four votes.95 On October 
15, a reluctant President Gerald Ford signed into law sweeping amendments to 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.96 
The 1974 FECA amendments transformed American campaign finance 
law. They established a per election limit of $1,000 on contributions to federal 
candidates; imposed a total aggregate biennial limit of $25,000 in total 
contributions by a single donor to all federal candidates and committees; 
limited total campaign expenditures by presidential and congressional 
candidates; restricted independent campaign expenditures to $1,000 per 
individual; mandated public disclosure of campaign contributions; created a 
presidential public financing system; and established the Federal Election 
Commission to enforce federal election law.97  
As it turned out, however, the most important campaign finance 
development of the Watergate era did not come in Congress. It came in the 
Supreme Court. Before the 1974 amendments could be implemented, a diverse 
group of plaintiffs, including Senator Buckley, former Democratic Senator 
Eugene McCarthy, and the American Civil Liberties Union,98 brought a 
constitutional challenge in a January 1975 lawsuit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia.99 Although they spanned the ideological 
spectrum, the plaintiffs shared a common fear that FECA could be used to 
silence political dissent. As Buckley later explained, “What we had in 
common was a concern that the restrictions imposed by the new law would 
squeeze independent voices out of the political process by making it even 
more difficult than it already was to raise effective challenges to the political 
status quo.”100 
Although Buckley opposed the new version of FECA, he persuaded his 
colleagues to include in the 1974 bill a provision for expedited judicial review 
                                                                                                                     
 94 120 CONG. REC. 27513–14. 
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of the new law’s constitutionality.101 Ironically, however, the complexity of 
the new procedures caused confusion, leading to several months of delay while 
the federal courts determined the proper procedure for hearing the lawsuit.102 
When the case finally reached an en banc panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, a narrow majority of the judges 
upheld the most important provisions of the amendments, including the 
expenditure caps.103 The majority held that “given the power of money and its 
various uses, and abuses, in the context of campaigns, there is a compelling 
interest in its regulation notwithstanding incidental limitations on freedom of 
speech and political association.”104 
The D.C. Circuit’s ruling, however, represented little more than a 
placeholder. As a result of the expedited review process, the Supreme Court 
would rule on the FECA amendments just five months later. As Professor 
Richard Hasen has noted, “[T]he Court felt pressure to decide the case before 
the 1976 presidential election season.”105  
In January 1976, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the case 
of Buckley v. Valeo.106 In a complicated and sprawling 294-page107 per curiam 
opinion, the Justices upheld FECA’s limits on contributions to candidates.108 
The lessons of Watergate shaped the Court’s approach to FECA. In Buckley, 
the Justices acknowledged the potentially corrupting influence of campaign 
contributions, warning in particular of large contributions “given to secure a 
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.”109 Although 
the Court did not mention Nixon by name, the Justices emphasized that “the 
deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election” demonstrated 
that the threat of corruption from campaign contributions “is not an illusory 
one.”110  
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Having recognized the government’s compelling interest in preventing 
campaign corruption and the appearance of corruption,111 a majority of the 
Court concluded that FECA’s $1,000 contribution limit was a reasonable 
policy response.112 The majority contended that the $1,000 limit did not 
“undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective 
discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, 
associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.”113 
Besides upholding contribution limits, the Court affirmed the creation of the 
FEC,114 the Act’s public financing provisions, and its disclosure 
requirements.115  
Momentously, however, the Buckley Court also struck down the caps on 
overall expenditures by candidates, parties, private individuals, and outside 
groups.116 The Court held that the restrictions on total spending violated the 
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association.117 The majority 
opinion warned that “a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to 
restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, and 
candidates.”118 Such restrictions, the Justices held, “limit political expression 
‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment 
freedoms.’”119 The Court adamantly rejected the notion that the Constitution 
permitted Congress to level the playing field for all speakers, insisting that 
“the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment.”120 The expenditure caps, the Court concluded, impaired 
“the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected 
political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.”121  
The Buckley decision thus created a hybrid campaign finance model that 
consisted of low limits on contributions to federal candidates and parties122 but 
no overall limits on total election spending. The troubling practical 
implications of the Court’s reasoning were immediately apparent to two key 
dissenters in the Buckley case: Justice Byron White and Chief Justice Warren 
Burger. Although they took polar opposite positions on what was wrong with 
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the majority’s opinion—Justice White argued for affirming FECA’s 
expenditure limits whereas Justice Burger advocated invalidating FECA’s 
contribution limits123—the two Justices agreed that the Buckley ruling created 
an unworkable campaign finance system.  
In his dissent, Justice White sharply criticized the majority for striking 
down FECA’s expenditure limits, a ruling he believed was founded on the 
erroneous presumption that “a candidate has a constitutional right to spend 
unlimited amounts of money, mostly that of other people, in order to be 
elected.”124 In contrast to the majority, White saw the goal of leveling the 
campaign finance playing field as constitutionally permissible.125 He 
contended that expenditure caps offered a “commonsense” solution to the 
problem of well-funded candidates gaining an “overpowering advantage” over 
their rivals “by reason of a huge campaign war chest.”126 He also viewed the 
importance of maintaining public confidence in the government’s integrity as 
compelling justification for the expenditure caps.127  
In particular, White chastised the majority for invalidating the expenditure 
caps without any empirical data regarding the real world consequences of 
FECA’s restrictions on campaign expenditures.128 The Court, he insisted, 
should have deferred to “the considered judgment of Congress” that FECA’s 
expenditure limits would not impair candidates’ ability to communicate with 
voters.129 Congress’s judgment impressed White as fundamentally sound. “At 
least so long as the ceiling placed upon the candidates is not plainly too low,” 
he reasoned, FECA would promote what White viewed as the constitutionally 
permissible goal of ensuring that election outcomes were not determined by 
“the difference in the amounts of money that candidates have to spend.”130 
White brought a unique personal perspective to the case. Prior to joining 
the Supreme Court, he worked on many political campaigns, including serving 
as Colorado state chair for John Kennedy’s 1960 presidential campaign.131 
Informed by that experience, White warned of the pernicious impact the 
Buckley majority’s low contribution limits/no expenditure caps model would 
have on the daily life of federal candidates and officeholders. He noted that 
one of the central purposes of FECA’s expenditure caps was to “ease the 
candidate’s understandable obsession with fundraising, and so free him and his 
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staff to communicate in more places and ways unconnected with the 
fundraising function.”132 However, White warned, the majority’s invalidation 
of the spending caps would force candidates back onto the fundraising 
“treadmill” and leave them with no choice but to undertake “the endless job of 
raising increasingly large sums of money.”133  
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger took the exact opposite position, 
contending that the Court should have invalidated both the contribution and 
expenditure limits.134 But Burger shared White’s concern that Buckley’s split 
decision on contribution limits and expenditure caps created a dysfunctional 
and unworkable system. As Burger explained, “[T]he Court’s result does 
violence to the intent of Congress in this comprehensive scheme of campaign 
finance.”135 The Chief Justice was sharply critical of the majority’s indecisive, 
halfway ruling: “By dissecting the Act bit by bit, and casting off vital parts, the 
Court fails to recognize that the whole of this Act is greater than the sum of its 
parts.”136 The FECA that emerged from the Buckley decision bore no 
resemblance to the regulatory scheme Congress attempted to establish. 
“Congress intended to regulate all aspects of federal campaign finances, but 
what remains after today’s holding leaves no more than a shadow of what 
Congress contemplated,” Burger concluded.137 “I question whether the residue 
leaves a workable program.”138  
As Justice White warned, the Buckley decision’s most important feature 
was the fact that the Justices lacked empirical data on FECA’s real world 
effects. Although passed in October 1974, the FECA amendments did not go 
into effect until the 1976 election, after the Buckley ruling.139 Accordingly, as 
Laurence Tribe observed in 1978, the Supreme Court in Buckley found itself 
“working in a factual vacuum” and “was forced to indulge in more than a little 
empirical speculation about such issues as the circumvention of expenditure 
limits and the impact of those limits on campaign speech.”140 Nor did the 
Supreme Court’s Justices have political experiences of their own to rely on, 
with the notable exception of Justice White, who dissented from the majority’s 
ruling. In a 1976 law review article, Professor Daniel Polsby pointed out the 
revealing fact that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the 
expenditure limits, was “unusually well endowed with members whose careers 
had given them first-hand experience in political campaigns.”141 In contrast, 
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Polsby observed, the Supreme Court Justices who invalidated FECA’s 
expenditure limits lacked “comparable political credentials” in their pre-Court 
biographies.142 
The next forty years would provide the empirical data that the Supreme 
Court lacked in Buckley. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley 
has been sharply criticized,143 it proved remarkably enduring. Subsequent 
cases would modify Buckley, but none overturned its central holdings 
regarding contribution and expenditure limits. For example, in the 2010 case 
of Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court cleared the way for independent 
expenditure groups organized as political action committees (PACs) to receive 
unlimited contributions from donors.144 Although the Citizens United decision 
created a storm of controversy,145 it did not change the two key features of the 
post-Watergate campaign finance model that FECA and Buckley established: 
low contribution limits on candidates and parties but no overall expenditure 
caps.  
The system that Buckley created soon proved to be deeply dysfunctional. 
As the distinguished political scientist Frank Sorauf observed on the tenth 
anniversary of the Buckley decision, “In their obsession with corruption of 
officials and their unconcern for the well-being of the electoral process” the 
Justices “framed a jurisprudence that was strangely, even quaintly, at odds 
with contemporary political realities.”146 The Buckley Justices’ most serious 
failing, Sorauf noted, was the fact that “they never grasped the idea of a flow 
of money, which if stopped at one outlet would build up pressure at others.”147 
Indeed, the last forty years of federal elections have demonstrated just how 
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profoundly the Supreme Court misunderstood the practical implications of its 
decision in Buckley. 
IV. BUCKLEY’S GHOST: THE FAILURE OF THE POST-WATERGATE 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORMS 
The dysfunctional nature of America’s post-Watergate campaign finance 
system manifests itself in three principal ways. First, the foremost goal of the 
1974 FECA amendments was to reduce the influence of money in politics, but 
Buckley’s invalidation of the expenditure caps ensured that campaign costs 
would soar. Second, the pernicious interaction of FECA’s low contribution 
limits with Buckley’s prohibition on expenditure caps forced members of 
Congress to focus on fundraising rather than legislating. Third, and finally, 
FECA’s low contribution limits utterly failed to arrest the public’s lack of 
confidence in the government’s integrity. The ironic result was FECA and 
Buckley created a system even worse than the pre-Watergate campaign finance 
system.  
A. Why Buckley, Not Citizens United, Created the Era of Skyrocketing 
Campaign Costs 
The overriding goal of the Watergate reforms was to reduce the role of 
money in American election campaigns.148 Congressional election spending, 
which had begun to grow in the 1960s, reached a then-record total of $98 
million in campaign expenditures in 1972.149 Campaign finance reformers 
argued that contribution and expenditure limits would end the money chase.150 
As Senator Hubert Humphrey explained during the Senate debate on the 
FECA amendments, the reforms were intended to free politicians from having 
to “spend so much of their time, energy and ultimately their 
credibility . . . begging for money.”151  
But the 1974 amendments never got the opportunity to stem the tide of 
money in politics. By striking down expenditure caps, the Supreme Court’s 
Buckley decision guaranteed that the money floodgates would remain open in 
American election campaigns. Justice White predicted precisely that 
development in his dissenting opinion in Buckley. He warned that “[w]ithout 
limits on total expenditures, campaign costs will inevitably and endlessly 
escalate.”152  
Just as White anticipated, federal campaign costs soared in the elections 
immediately following the Buckley decision. Total expenditures for House 
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candidates shot up from $44 million in 1974 to $86 million in 1978 to $174 
million in 1982.153 Senate spending increased just as fast. Total expenditures 
for Senate candidates rose from $28 million in 1974 to $64 million in 1978 to 
$114 million in 1982.154 The increase in federal election spending far 
exceeded the rate of inflation.155 In just the two years between the 1976 and 
1978 elections, the cost of House and Senate races increased by 44% and 70%, 
respectively.156 Overall, average campaign expenditures by House candidates 
nearly tripled between 1974 and 1984.157 The number of expensive races also 
grew exponentially. In 1974, only ten House candidates spent $200,000 or 
more on their campaigns; by 1980, 205 House candidates spent more than 
$200,000.158 In 1982, sixty-seven House candidates spent more than half a 
million dollars each on their campaigns.159  
Ironically, the burden fell particularly heavily on challengers.160 FECA’s 
critics had claimed that expenditure caps would harm challengers,161 but 
instead the reverse proved true. In the absence of expenditure limits, 
incumbents possessed a huge and growing fundraising advantage.162 In 1980, 
the average cost of a successful challenge to a House incumbent was 242% 
more than it was in 1974.163 Similarly, in 1980 it cost on average $353,000 to 
defeat a Republican House incumbent and $341,000 to defeat a Democratic 
House incumbent.164 By 1990, the average House incumbent spent 
approximately four times as much as the average challenger.165  
Congressional campaign costs continued to soar in the 1990s and 2000s. 
In the 1990 midterm elections, House and Senate candidates spent a combined 
total of $446 million.166 In 1996, congressional campaign expenditures 
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reached $765 million.167 Inflation did not account for the difference. 
Campaign costs in Senate and House elections rose at twice the rate of 
inflation between 1974 and 1998.168 The 2000s saw an even faster increase.169 
Controlling for inflation, the average cost of a victorious candidate’s campaign 
in House elections rose from $360,000 in 1986 (in 2012 dollars) to $1.6 
million in 2012, and in Senate elections rose from $6.4 million in 1986 (in 
2012 dollars) to $10.4 million in 2012.170 
Presidential races saw an even more dramatic increase in costs. The 1976 
election—the first post-Buckley presidential campaign—cost $160 million, 
which broke the 1972 record.171 The increase resulted in part from FECA’s 
public financing program for presidential candidates.172 But the growth in 
private expenditures in presidential elections also grew at an accelerating rate, 
from $275 million in 1980173 to $1.8 billion in 2008.174 The increase far 
exceeded inflation. In real dollar terms, presidential campaign costs in 2008 
were about four times higher than in 1972,175 the year of the Watergate break-
in.  
Most remarkable of all, the figures above tell only part of the story. If 
spending by PACs, party committees, Section 527 groups,176 and Section 
501(c)(4) groups177 are added to spending by presidential and congressional 
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candidate committees, the total amount of federal election spending in 2008 
reached almost $6 billion.178  
The accelerating cost of campaigns did not happen by accident. Buckley’s 
low contribution limits/no expenditure caps model went into effect at the exact 
moment that television advertising became extremely expensive.179 The 
increase began in the 1960s as the percentage of American homes with 
television sets rose from 34% in 1952 to 92% in 1964.180 Television’s 
ubiquitous nature made it a mandatory advertising medium for federal 
candidates as early as the 1960s.181 Election costs increased accordingly.182 In 
a span of just four years, American campaign spending rose from $300 million 
in 1968 to $425 million in 1972.183  
The increase in media costs in the 1960s and 1970s was just the tip of the 
iceberg. The cost of television advertising soared in the decades that followed. 
The history of television Super Bowl advertisements tells the story.184 In 2013 
dollars, the cost of a thirty-second television advertisement during Super Bowl 
I in 1967 was $293,000; in 1985, that figure rose to $1.1 million; in 1999, it 
rose to $2.2 million; and by 2013, the cost of a thirty-second television 
advertisement during the Super Bowl was $3.8 million.185 Super Bowl 
advertising costs continue to grow at an accelerating rate. For instance, 
between 2006 and 2015, Super Bowl advertisement prices increased by 
76%.186 In 2016, the cost of a thirty-second Super Bowl advertisement reached 
$5 million.187 And it’s not just special events like the Super Bowl that are 
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expensive. A thirty-second television advertisement during a primetime 
regular season game in 2011 cost $425,000.188 Moreover, those numbers do 
not include the cost of producing the commercial itself.189  
The result is relentlessly increasing media costs for commercial and 
political advertisers alike.190 Indeed, annual outlays of billions of dollars are a 
commonplace feature of the American commercial advertising landscape.191 
Thus, while the billions spent on federal election campaigns outrages 
reformers and the general public alike, campaign spending represents only a 
fraction of the $180 billion that U.S. businesses spend annually in commercial 
advertising.192 Buckley’s invalidation of the expenditure caps forced 
candidates to face the same spiraling advertising costs that corporate America 
has since the 1960s. And FECA’s low contribution limits required candidates 
to raise the millions necessary to pay for television advertisements in woefully 
inadequate increments.193 Candidates have been on a fundraising treadmill 
ever since, just as Justice White predicted.  
In recent years, Buckley’s central role in promoting skyrocketing campaign 
costs has been overshadowed by the controversy over the 2010 Citizens United 
case. Supporters of comprehensive campaign finance regulation, such as 2016 
presidential candidate Bernie Sanders,194 claim that Citizens United is the 
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cause of America’s billion dollar federal election campaigns.195 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, public anger at election costs tends to focus on the 
notion that reversing Citizens United would stop the cycle of escalating 
campaign costs. For example, a 2015 Bloomberg poll found that 78% of 
Americans support overturning Citizens United in order to reduce the 
influence of money in politics.196  
But as the FEC data clearly demonstrates, the surge in campaign 
expenditures began long before Citizens United. Federal election spending 
took off in the 1960s, accelerated after Buckley, and reached the multi-billion-
dollar level in the early 2000s.197 The 2000 election cost $3.8 billion, the 2004 
election cost $4.5 billion, and the 2008 election cost just under $6 billion.198 
Crucially, each of those multi-billion dollar elections occurred before the 
Supreme Court’s January 2010 Citizens United decision. 
Moreover, although campaign costs have continued to increase since the 
Citizens United decision, they have not increased at a rate faster than the pre-
Citizens United increases. For instance, in the 2012 presidential and 
congressional elections total spending reached an all-time record of $7 
billion.199 But that was completely in line with the relentless increase in 
federal campaign spending in the three presidential elections that preceded 
Citizens United. Indeed, during the 2000 to 2012 time period, total spending in 
federal elections increased by about $1 billion every four years: from $3.8 
billion in 2000 to $4.5 billion in 2004 to $5.9 billion in 2008 to $7 billion in 
2012.200 Hence, although the $1.1 billion increase in 2012 from 2008 was 
greater than the $700 million increase between 2000 and 2004, it was less than 
the $1.4 billion increase from 2004 to 2008, and well within the average rate 
of increase for the 2000 to 2012 time period.201  
In other words, the historical trend lines strongly suggest that total 
spending in the 2012 campaign would likely have reached $7 billion 
regardless of how the Supreme Court ruled in Citizens United. As the FEC 
data shows, billion-dollar quadrennial increases in presidential election year 
spending were already a routine feature of the American political landscape 
before the Citizens United decision.202 
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Nor did Citizens United begin the era of massive outlays in independent 
expenditures. Although it is true that 2012 saw independent expenditures reach 
a record amount of $1.2 billion,203 the reality is outside groups were already 
spending hundreds of millions of dollars before Citizens United. In 2004, 
Section 527 committees and Section 501(c) organizations spent a total of $484 
million in the 2004 presidential and congressional elections and $454 million 
in the 2008 elections.204 In addition, PACs spent $135 million in independent 
expenditures in 2008, double the amount they spent in 2004.205 Citizens 
United created new and more powerful campaign finance vehicles for donors 
to use, but hundreds of millions of dollars in independent expenditures were 
already an entrenched part of federal election campaigns.  
Thus, when America’s skyrocketing campaign costs are viewed in 
historical context, it seems likely that the long-term significance of Citizens 
United will pale in comparison to the importance of the Buckley decision. The 
fact is Buckley, not Citizens United, gave rise to the modern era of multi-
billion-dollar federal election campaigns.  
But Buckley’s ramifications are not confined to relentlessly soaring 
campaign costs. The interaction of FECA’s low contribution limits with 
Buckley’s invalidation of expenditure caps has also had a profoundly adverse 
impact on the daily business of Congress.  
B. How Buckley and FECA Warped the Legislative Process  
Instead of reducing the influence of money in politics, the Watergate 
reforms had the paradoxical consequence of increasing the amount of time that 
politicians needed to spend raising money. Here again, Justice White 
anticipated the toxic consequences of combining FECA’s contribution limits 
with Buckley’s ban on expenditure caps. In his Buckley dissent, White warned 
that without expenditure caps “[p]ressure to raise funds will constantly 
build.”206  
White’s prediction proved all too accurate. FECA’s low contribution 
limits, which Buckley upheld, placed federal candidates on a grueling 
fundraising treadmill in which they must constantly raise millions of dollars in 
small increments.207 As fundraising monopolized elected officials’ time and 
energy, it also distracted them from their core legislative duties.208 Members 
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of Congress found themselves with far less time to develop public policy 
expertise and to master the legislative process.209 Inevitably, fundraising skills 
became the chief asset for any member who aspired to serve in the 
congressional leadership.  
To be sure, long before FECA, money played a prominent role in 
campaigns. As the Gilded Age political operative Mark Hanna famously 
declared, “There are two things that are important in politics. The first is 
money, and I can’t remember what the second one is.”210 The influence of 
money in American elections dates as far back as the colonial era. For 
instance, in the 1755 election for the Virginia House of Burgesses, novice 
candidate George Washington broke with local custom by declining to incur 
the expense of “treat[ing]” the voters with alcohol.211 Washington’s fiscal 
restraint did not impress the electorate and they handed him in return a 
surprising defeat.212 He would not make the same mistake again. In the 1758 
election, Washington spared no expense, purchasing 160 gallons of alcohol for 
the voters.213 Washington’s generous campaign expenditure impressed the 
voters and he went on to win the first election victory of his long political 
career.214  
But during the first 200 years of American political history, candidates did 
not face the challenge of raising large amounts of money in small increments. 
Prior to the 1974 FECA amendments, federal candidates and officeholders 
relied on large contributions that could be quickly and efficiently solicited 
from a small number of donors.215 William McKinley’s 1896 presidential 
campaign served as an early example. McKinley raised $3.5 million in 
contributions from corporations and wealthy individuals, a record total at the 
time.216 The practice of soliciting large contributions from the rich and 
                                                                                                                     
 209 See id. 
 210 JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY MEN: THE REAL STORY OF FUND-RAISING’S 
INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 29–30 (2000) (quoting Mark Hanna); see 
also UROFSKY, supra note 160, at 3 (quoting Mark Hanna). 
 211 W.J. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 152 
(1979). 
 212 DENNIS J. POGUE, FOUNDING SPIRITS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE BEGINNINGS 
OF THE AMERICAN WHISKEY INDUSTRY 16 (Judy Rogers ed., 2011); WILLARD STERNE 
RANDALL, GEORGE WASHINGTON 184 (1997) (explaining that Washington lost in 1755 
because “he had no organization and had spent no money”). 
 213 2 DOUGLAS SOUTHALL FREEMAN, GEORGE WASHINGTON 320–21 (1948). 
 214 Id. at 320. 
 215 See CLIFFORD W. BROWN, JR. ET AL., SERIOUS MONEY: FUNDRAISING AND 
CONTRIBUTING IN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION CAMPAIGNS 19 (1995) (“[P]rior to the 1974 
FECA amendments, the campaigns of the major candidates all received much, and in many 
cases most, of their revenues from very large contributions.”); see also BIRNBAUM, supra 
note 210, at 32; D.W. BROGAN, POLITICS IN AMERICA 255, 259 (1954). 
 216 MARGARET LEECH, IN THE DAYS OF MCKINLEY 86–87 (1959); see also BIRNBAUM, 
supra note 210, at 29; BROGAN, supra note 215, at 255; GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES 
THE MONEY TREE? AMERICAN CAMPAIGN FINANCING PRACTICES FROM 1789 TO THE 
PRESENT 48–50 (1973). 
816 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:4 
powerful continued for the first seven decades of the twentieth century. Before 
the 1970s, federal candidates and the national parties relied on corporations, 
labor unions, special interest groups, and wealthy families to fund political 
campaigns.217 For instance, in the mid-twentieth century, large donors made 
up about 70% of campaign donations to the Democrats and 74% of donations 
to the Republicans.218 With large contributors responsible for the bulk of 
federal campaign contributions, fundraising in the pre-FECA era was highly 
efficient.219 A prime example was the Democratic Party’s annual 
congressional fundraising dinner, which generated a substantial portion of all 
the campaign funds used by Democratic House and Senate candidates during 
each election cycle.220  
The efficiency of the pre-FECA fundraising system did not come without 
a price. The pervasive dependence of candidates and parties on large campaign 
contributors gave the donors special access to—and influence with—federal 
officeholders.221 Campaign contributors often had vested interests in pending 
or potential legislation.222 As a 1960 study by the political scientist Donald R. 
Matthews found, the typical U.S. Senator’s campaign fund relied on “a few 
large contributions from individuals and groups with a vital interest in” the 
Senator’s “behavior in office.”223 In return, grateful senators paid special 
attention to “requests for favors” from large campaign contributors.224 Many 
donors saw campaign contributions as a defensive act, rather than one intended 
to secure special legislation in their favor. Writing in 1954, D.W. Brogan 
observed that wealthy campaign contributors were typically motivated by the 
fear of “hostile legislative action or hostile executive discretion.”225  
From a legislative perspective, the practice of quickly raising large 
amounts of money from a handful of wealthy political supporters had one 
crucial advantage: it permitted Congress to focus on legislative business rather 
than constant fundraising. Prior to the 1970s, senators usually did not raise 
money until the final two years of their six-year terms.226 Even most freshman 
members of the House saw no need to raise money in non-election years.227 
Consequently, after the November election, the new Congress turned its 
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attention to legislation.228 With no need for members to hurry home for 
weekend fundraisers, a five-day Congressional workweek was standard in the 
mid-twentieth century.229  
The short fundraising season freed members to focus on legislation and 
public policy. In his 1960 study of the Senate, Donald Matthews described 
how the Senate’s culture expected members to devote their time to “highly 
detailed, dull, and politically unrewarding” legislative business.230 Members 
who failed to assume sufficient legislative responsibilities incurred the disdain 
of their peers.231 The political scientist Richard Fenno, Jr., found a similar 
culture in the House of Representatives in a 1962 study.232 Fenno wrote that 
House members were expected to develop subject matter expertise in 
specialized legislative areas and above all were expected to make “hard work” 
a priority in mastering policy details and the legislative process.233 House 
Speaker Sam Rayburn set the example himself, working in his Capitol Hill 
office six days a week.234 
Equally important, in the pre-FECA era, members of Congress had time to 
get to know their colleagues, including members of the other party.235 Personal 
relationships cannot be easily quantified and thus they tend to be ignored or 
underrated by scholars, but they are essential to legislative leadership. For 
example, in the 1950s House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority 
Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson, both Democrats, met President Dwight 
Eisenhower, a Republican, at the White House on a regular basis for an end-
of-the-day cocktail.236 Johnson and Rayburn also cultivated strong personal 
ties with their colleagues on Capitol Hill. One of the most effective legislative 
leaders in history, Johnson devoted his evenings and weekends to socializing 
with fellow senators, ranging from the arch-segregationist Richard Russell to 
the liberal progressive Hubert Humphrey.237 Rayburn likewise used his free 
time to build a personal connection with rank-and-file House members.238  
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But the introduction of FECA’s contributions limits in 1974, coupled with 
Buckley’s invalidation of expenditure caps, ushered in the era of the 
“permanent campaign.”239 A culture of constant fundraising took hold on 
Capitol Hill. As the historian Lewis Gould has observed, the “hectic 
atmosphere of perpetual campaigning” eroded “the older values of collegiality 
and comity” on Capitol Hill “to the point of virtual disappearance.”240 
The 1974 FECA amendments brought an end to the age of quickly raising 
large sums of campaign money. FECA’s contribution limits241 gave rise to a 
drastically changed fundraising environment.242 As one Democratic fundraiser 
admitted in 1987, “Used to be, you’d get a dozen people in the room and come 
up with half a million dollars for sure. Now if you get $25,000 you’re doing 
great.”243 Likewise, the historian Ross Baker noted that “[w]here it was once 
sufficient to attend an annual Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner or a Lincoln Day 
dinner to fatten the coffers of the party,” the era of “decentralized fundraising” 
required far greater investments of time and energy.244  
As campaign costs ballooned in the late twentieth century, federal 
officeholders faced the daunting task of raising more money than ever before 
in smaller increments than ever before.245 From 1976 to 2002, years during 
which the cost of election campaigns soared, FECA imposed a $1,000 
contribution limit on individual donations to federal candidates.246 The 
inevitable consequence was federal candidates had no choice but to constantly 
search for new donors.247 Even when the Bipartisan Campaign Finance 
Reform Act of 2003 (BCRA) raised the contribution limit to $2,000 and 
indexed it to inflation,248 the maximum permitted individual contribution 
remained a tiny amount relative to the millions needed to mount a federal 
election campaign. Federal officeholders had no choice but to devote much of 
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their workdays to fundraising,249 even in non-election years.250 By 1998, 
incumbent federal officeholders raised on average about 40% of their total 
campaign funds during off-years,251 and the off-year fundraising typically 
exceeded the total amount raised by congressional challengers.252 As the 
historian Lewis Gould noted, by the 1980s “[t]he average senator was caught 
in a never-ending round of asking for money, lining up donors, and providing 
favors for well-heeled constituents.”253 By the end of the 1990s, House 
incumbents typically raised $7,000 per week throughout their two-year 
terms.254 And by 2014, the typical senator raised on average $10,000 per day 
every day of the senator’s six-year term.255 
Correspondingly, the amount of time Congress devoted to legislative 
business steadily shrunk. The average length of the House’s two-year session 
declined from 323 days in the 1970s to 250 days in 2008.256 Likewise, the 
Senate workweek began to contract in the 1970s to enable members to return 
home on fundraising trips.257 By the late 1980s, the Congressional workweek 
began on Tuesday and ended early on Fridays.258 As Senator Bob Byrd of 
West Virginia observed in 1987, senators wanted Mondays off and short days 
on Fridays because “[t]hey have to go raise the money and they don’t want any 
roll-call votes.”259 Byrd warned that such short weeks threatened the Senate’s 
ability to function, and he lamented that senators had become “full-time fund-
raisers, instead of full-time legislators.”260 But Byrd’s warnings had no effect. 
By 2013, 78% of members of Congress spent at least forty weekends each year 
in their home districts.261 When they don’t spend the weekend in their home 
districts, members also routinely travel to resorts or major cities to attend 
fundraisers.262  
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Even when Congress is in session, fundraising consumes much of the 
congressional workday. For example, in 2013 the Democratic Congressional 
Campaign Committee directed that new members of Congress should spend 
four to six hours per day every day raising campaign money.263 Similarly, in a 
2016 CBS 60 Minutes interview, Florida Representative David Jolly revealed 
that the House Republican caucus requires members to raise $18,000 a day in 
campaign contributions.264 Congressional leaders manage the House floor 
schedule to maximize the time available for members to solicit campaign 
contributions and attend fundraisers.265 In addition, the national parties 
maintain phone banks in office buildings within walking distance of the 
Capitol Building for members to make fundraising calls during the 
workday.266 
The relentless demands of raising massive amounts of money in small 
contributions have deeply undermined the legislative process.267 As the 
political scientist James Curry explains, “members of Congress are 
overwhelmed by the tremendous demands on their limited time and 
resources.”268 Members no longer have the time to master public policy issues 
in depth or regularly attend committee meetings.269 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the typical member of Congress has become dependent on lobbyists 
and congressional leaders for information on the legislation pending before 
Congress.270 Curry concludes that the lack of information possessed by rank-
and-file members of Congress undermines their ability to “participate 
meaningfully and independently in policymaking.”271 
It is critical to note that the advent of the “permanent campaign” long 
predated the 2010 Citizens United decision. By the 1980s and 1990s, it was 
clear that the all-consuming nature of raising vast amounts of money in small 
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increments left little time for members to develop deep knowledge of the 
substantive policy issues before Congress.272 Years before Citizens United, 
leading political scientists warned that fundraising had undermined Congress’s 
ability to legislate in competent and effective fashion.273 In 2000, the political 
scientist Anthony Corrado concluded that the excessive amount of time 
devoted to raising money meant that members of Congress were “spending 
less time learning legislative practice, understanding the details of major 
policy debates, or becoming acquainted with their professional colleagues.”274  
Moreover, although FECA prevented wealthy donors from making large 
contributions to candidates and parties, it did not eliminate candidate and party 
dependence on powerful and influential fundraisers.275 In 1974, 
Congresswoman Bella Abzug contended that the FECA amendments would 
reduce the influence of wealthy white men.276 But a 1995 study found that 
“contributors of serious money [to presidential campaigns] are effectively just 
as wealthy, well-educated, white, and male today as they were before the 
reform rules were implemented.”277 Similarly, a 2016 Brennan Center study 
found that wealthy white men dominate the ranks of campaign contributors.278 
Indeed, one of the great ironies of FECA’s low contribution limits is that they 
have placed federal officeholders on a constant and unending search for new 
donors.279 In turn, the need to solicit a huge number of small contributions 
from as many donors as possible has given wealthy special interests just as 
much access to federal officeholders as during the pre-FECA era.280  
FECA’s emphasis on small contributions has also enhanced the influence 
of a particular type of donor: the well-connected individual with extensive 
fundraising contacts.281 FECA gave rise to the practice of bundling, whereby a 
single person or group solicits contributions from hundreds of donors.282 
Although the solicited donations remain subject to FECA’s contribution limits, 
a bundler with enough wealthy friends can facilitate hundreds of thousands of 
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dollars in contributions to a single federal candidate.283 In the era of low 
contribution limits, bundlers have become indispensable to federal 
campaigns.284 President George W. Bush’s campaign awarded honorary 
designations to bundlers who solicited money above certain thresholds.285 
Bush supporters who bundled $100,000 in contributions received special 
recognition by the campaign as “Pioneer” fundraisers and those who solicited 
$200,000 or more in contributions earned the title of “Ranger” fundraisers.286 
Fundraising’s critical importance in modern election campaigns, an ironic 
and unintended consequence of FECA’s low contribution limits, has 
transformed the congressional leadership ranks. Where seniority and 
legislative expertise once were required to hold a leadership position, 
fundraising proficiency has become the single most important credential. As a 
direct consequence of FECA’s low contribution limits, fundraising skills 
eclipsed legislative knowledge and policy expertise as prerequisites for serving 
in the congressional leadership.287 The post-Watergate reforms thus shifted the 
center of gravity in Congress from members with seniority288 and legislative 
expertise to members with fundraising skills.289  
Fundraising remains a central duty of congressional leaders even after they 
assume leadership positions.290 House and Senate caucus rules require party 
leaders to establish personal “leadership PACs” to raise money on behalf of 
colleagues and party committees.291 For example, after Nancy Pelosi became 
House Speaker in 2007, House Democratic caucus rules required her to 
contribute $800,000 to the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 
and generate $25 million in additional contributions to the Party’s 
candidates.292 But the reality is all members bear heavy fundraising 
burdens.293 After Republicans took control of Congress in 1994, House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich established fundraising requirements for rank-and-file 
members of the House Republican caucus, not just party leaders.294 
Congressional Democratic leaders later adopted the same requirements for 
their caucus members.295 In addition, both parties base committee assignments 
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on members’ fundraising success.296 The ultimate irony, therefore, is that 
FECA’s focus on low contribution limits has paradoxically made fundraising 
the principal focus of the day-to-day activities of Congress.297  
Although raising money has become a preeminent job requirement for 
federal officeholders, most politicians view the grueling task of constant 
fundraising as one of the most distasteful parts of running for office.298 The 
demeaning and exhausting demands of fundraising have driven experienced 
officeholders to resign and have deterred talented candidates from running for 
office in the first place.299 For example, the unrelenting demands of 
fundraising drove eight-term Congressman Steve Israel of New York to 
announce his retirement in January 2016.300 “I don’t think I can spend another 
day in another call room making another call begging for money,” Israel 
declared.301 “I always knew the system was dysfunctional. Now it is beyond 
broken.”302  
That is a far cry from what Congress intended when it passed the ’74 
amendments. Instead of curbing the influence of money in politics, FECA’s 
contribution limits ushered in a new era of nonstop fundraising by federal 
officeholders. The irony was not lost on James Buckley, the plaintiff in 
Buckley v. Valeo. In 2006 he wryly observed, “The 1974 amendments were 
supposed to de-emphasize the role of money in federal elections. Instead, by 
severely limiting the size of individual contributions, today’s law has made the 
search for money a candidate’s central preoccupation.”303 Buckley himself 
was partially responsible for that development. When the Supreme Court 
upheld his challenge to FECA’s expenditure caps, it guaranteed that the money 
chase would dominate presidential and congressional campaigns for decades 
to come.  
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C. Why FECA Failed to Restore Public Confidence in the Government’s 
Integrity 
When Congress debated amending FECA in 1974, supporters returned 
time and again to the central point that the reforms would restore public 
confidence in the government after the trauma of Watergate. Congressman 
Spark Matsunaga of Hawaii described the FECA amendments as “our best and 
most constructive response to the terrible abuses of Watergate,” and he 
promised that the “amendments will help restore the faith of the American 
people in their Government.”304  
Whether FECA’s expenditure caps would have enhanced public 
confidence in the government’s integrity is unknowable. What is clear is that 
FECA’s low contribution limits have not achieved that goal. For example, 
annual surveys by the Pew Research Center in the 1990s and 2000s 
consistently found that about 50% of Americans believed that political 
corruption was getting worse, whereas only 10% believed political corruption 
was declining.305 Another study found that the percentage of Americans who 
believe that special interests dominate the government doubled between the 
1960s and the 1990s.306 Even more striking, a 2008 Gallup Poll found that 
Americans’ level of trust in government was at the lowest level since 
Watergate307 and soon thereafter, the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) found that the percentage of Americans who believed government 
corruption was widespread doubled from 32% in 1970 to 64% in 2012.308  
The historical polling data is particularly important because it 
demonstrates that the public’s cynical view of the government’s integrity long 
predates the 2010 Citizens United decision. Indeed, a 2004 study by Nathaniel 
Persily and Kelli Lammie found that “trends in general attitudes of corruption 
seem unrelated to anything happening in the campaign finance system.”309 
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Likewise, a study by David Primo found that campaign finance laws did little 
to improve public confidence in the government’s integrity.310  
Instead, there is reason to believe that rampant partisanship and 
ideological polarization have played a far larger role in shaping the public’s 
perception of widespread government corruption. A study by the political 
scientists Marc Hetherington and Thomas Rudolph found that Americans have 
become so polarized that they view the federal government with distrust 
whenever their preferred party is out of power.311 For example, during Ronald 
Reagan’s presidency, less than half of Democrats trusted the government; 
during Bill Clinton’s presidency, less than one third of Republicans expressed 
trust in the government.312 The problem is getting worse. Hetherington and 
Rudolph found that during Barack Obama’s presidency, fewer than 10% of 
Republicans expressed trust in the government.313 The result, they warn, is 
that Americans have “vanishingly low trust in government when their party is 
out of power.”314 
Indeed, even if Buckley had upheld FECA’s expenditure caps, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the political assassinations of the 1960s, the 
Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal undermined public confidence in 
government and other institutions far more than FECA could ever ameliorate. 
As Gary Orren observed in a 1997 study of public opinion, “Americans have 
lost faith in banks, corporations, labor unions, lawyers, doctors, universities, 
public schools, and the media.”315 And that was before the 1999 Clinton 
impeachment, the deadlocked 2000 presidential election, the September 11 
terrorist attacks, the Iraq War, the financial crisis of 2008, and the extreme 
polarization of the 2010s. In short, long-term historical trends have 
undermined public confidence in government institutions far beyond campaign 
finance reform’s ability to remedy the problem. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW? 
So what should we do? 
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The answer to that question rests with the Supreme Court. The Court 
created our campaign finance dysfunction and only it can fix it. Accordingly, 
the next time the Justices have an opportunity to revisit Buckley and Citizens 
United, the Supreme Court must once and for all decide a key constitutional 
question: Does the First Amendment permit comprehensive campaign finance 
regulations, or does it instead require sweeping deregulation?  
The Justices need to give us a definitive answer to that question. To do so, 
they have two options. The first is to follow Chief Justice Burger’s lead and 
embrace deregulation wholeheartedly by extending the Citizens United 
decision to candidates and parties, not just Super PACs. The Justices could do 
so by striking down contribution limits as an impermissible violation of 
freedom of speech and association.316 The Court would thus make clear that 
the First Amendment takes precedence over efforts to fight campaign 
corruption or promote egalitarianism. 
The second option is to take the exact opposite approach by reversing both 
Citizens United and Buckley’s ban on expenditure limits. The Justices could 
overturn those decisions by ruling that the Constitution permits Congress to 
not only impose contribution limits on Super PACs but also to establish an 
overall cap on federal campaign spending.317 Following Justice White’s lead, 
the Court would thus make clear that principles of egalitarian democracy and 
the battle against corruption justify significant limits on the First 
Amendment.318 
Although they involve diametrically opposed views of the Constitution, 
both approaches have merit. 
Deregulation of campaign finance law is far from a radical idea. Several 
states place no limits on the amount donors may contribute to gubernatorial 
and legislative candidates, including blue states like Oregon, red states like 
                                                                                                                     
 316 For scholarly critiques of campaign finance reform, see generally JOHN SAMPLES, 
THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2006); BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE 
SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2001); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty 
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE 
L.J. 1049 (1996); and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Speech About Political 
Candidates: The Unintended Consequences of Three Proposals, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 47 (2000). 
 317 See, e.g., HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 8, at 176–89. See generally 
ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(2014). 
 318 See, e.g., HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED, supra note 8, at 176–89; Edward B. Foley, 
Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1204, 1208–13 (1994); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money 
Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1010 (1976). See generally Spencer Overton, The Donor 
Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73 (2004); 
Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599. 
2016] MONEY IN POLITICS 827 
Alabama, and purple states like Iowa.319 The fact that a deregulated model 
does not lead to a particular ideological or partisan outcome is telling. It 
suggests that unlimited contributions may have less impact on election 
outcomes than the conventional wisdom that money buys elections would 
suggest.320  
Indeed, if contribution limits had a substantial impact on elections, one 
would expect to see a divergence between federal and state election outcomes 
in deregulated states. The presence of contribution limits in federal elections 
and the corresponding absence of them in the state elections would 
presumably lead to significant differences in state and federal outcomes in 
deregulated states like Oregon, Alabama, and Iowa. But that does not seem to 
be the case. Instead, there is a striking similarity in federal and state outcomes 
in deregulated states. The natural partisan preferences and ideological 
inclinations of voters in deregulated states shine through in both the state 
elections, which lack contribution limits, and the federal elections, which 
impose strict contribution limits. 
For example, Oregon is a strongly Democratic state in which liberal and 
progressive politicians have thrived in both no-limit state elections and strict-
limit federal elections.321 Democrats have won every Oregon governor’s race 
since 1986.322 In legislative elections, Democrats hold large majorities in the 
state senate and state house.323 In federal elections, both of Oregon’s U.S. 
Senators are Democrats, and Democrats also hold four of Oregon’s five U.S. 
House seats.324 Democratic presidential candidates have won Oregon in every 
election since 1988.325 
Alabama, in contrast, is a strongly Republican state in which conservative 
politicians have thrived in both no-limit state elections and strict-limit federal 
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elections.326 Republicans have held Alabama’s governor’s office since 
2003.327 In legislative elections, Alabama Republicans have controlled the 
state senate and the state house since 2011.328 In federal elections, both of 
Alabama’s U.S. Senators are Republicans, and Republicans also hold six of 
Alabama’s seven U.S. House seats.329 Republican presidential candidates have 
won Alabama in every election since 1980.330 
Iowa represents a middle path between conservative Alabama and liberal 
Oregon. Since 1994, Iowa Republicans have won three governor’s races, and 
Iowa Democrats have won three governor’s races.331 Iowa Republicans 
control the State House and Iowa Democrats control the State Senate.332 In 
federal elections, Republicans hold both U.S. Senate seats and three of Iowa’s 
four U.S. House seats.333 Yet, in presidential elections, Democrats have won 
Iowa in every election but one since 1988.334 By any measure, Iowa is a 
middle of the road state in both no-limit state elections and strict-limit federal 
elections.335  
The critical point is deregulation does not dictate any particular set of 
partisan or ideological outcomes. Nor is there any indication that the states that 
have pursued deregulation are any more corrupt than those that impose strict 
contribution limits in state elections.336 Alabama has fared poorly in rankings 
of corruption in state government, whereas Oregon and Iowa have fared 
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comparatively well.337 For example, Oregon and Iowa have among the lowest 
rates of convicted public officials.338 After examining the corruption data, 
Peter Wallison and Joel Gora concluded that “there is no evident or prevalent 
pattern of corruption in . . . no-limit states.”339 The bottom line is the 
underlying political culture of any given state is a far better predictor of 
election outcomes than the state’s campaign finance laws.  
Federal election history also belies the notion that plutocracy is the 
inevitable result of a deregulated campaign finance system. As discussed in 
Part III, in the forty years preceding FECA’s effective date—April 7, 1972—
there was no FEC, and the federal regulations governing contribution limits, 
expenditure caps, and disclosure were essentially toothless.340 In the 1940s, 
the political scientist Louise Overacker described federal campaign finance 
law as “farcical” because its loopholes were “as wide as a barn door.”341 
Similarly, in the 1960s, Congressman James Wright of Texas warned that 
federal campaign finance law was “intentionally evaded by almost every 
candidate.”342  
Yet, the Wild West era of campaign finance did not lead to the super rich 
dominating American public policy. Instead, ironically, the largely 
unregulated campaign finance era of 1932 to 1972 was the most progressive 
era in American history. It gave the country FDR’s New Deal,343 Social 
Security,344 Truman’s Fair Deal,345 the Great Society,346 Medicare,347 
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Medicaid,348 the Civil Rights Acts,349 and the highest tax rates350 in American 
history.  
The crucial point is the golden age of progressive reform thus occurred at 
a time when wealthy donors could effectively make secret and unlimited 
campaign contributions. As Yale Law Professor Ralph Winter observed in 
1974 during the debate over the FECA amendments, “The allegations that 
money [in political campaigns] blocks social change quite simply ignore 
history. During the last forty years, an immense amount of social and 
regulatory legislation has been enacted. This alone would refute the assertion 
that campaign money is a barrier to change.”351  
Nixon’s presidency itself demonstrated the complicated relationship 
between the influence of wealthy donors and the policies pursued by the 
officeholders the donors support. Nixon took million-dollar contributions from 
wealthy supporters and illegal contributions from corporations.352 Yet, as 
president, Nixon imposed wage and price controls, signed the Clean Air Act, 
and created the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, and the Consumer Products Safety Commission.353  
The Nixon example demonstrates a problem for campaign contributors 
that the wealthy industrialist Henry Clay Frick identified more than a century 
ago. Corporations and wealthy individuals, including Frick, heavily supported 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 election campaign.354 Frick personally 
contributed $100,000 to the President’s campaign and corporations and 
insurance companies donated more than $1.5 million to Roosevelt.355 But after 
his election, Roosevelt embraced sweeping progressive reforms, infuriating his 
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campaign contributors.356 In frustration, Frick angrily declared, “We bought 
the son of a bitch . . . and then he did not stay bought.”357 
Similarly, in the 1960s and early 1970s, a wide range of scholars who 
studied the impact of campaign contributions during the unregulated pre-1972 
era found that the influence of contributions on public policy was greatly 
overstated. As Alexander Heard observed in 1960, “[I]t has been repeatedly 
demonstrated that he who pays the piper does not always call the tune, at least 
not in politics. Politicians prize votes more than dollars.”358 Similarly, in 1968 
Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky found that while wealthy campaign 
contributors had enhanced access to officeholders, the impact on policy was 
modest at best.359  
The evidence also failed to show that contributions determined who won 
election campaigns during the pre-FECA era.360 In assessing the forty-four 
years of presidential elections between 1932 and 1976, Wildavsky and Polsby 
found no evidence that money bought election victories.361 They noted that 
while Republicans outraised Democrats in every presidential election between 
1932 and 1976, Democrats won eight of the twelve elections held during those 
years.362 Wildavsky and Polsby concluded that “with the possible exception of 
1968, there does not seem to have been a single presidential election in this 
century that any competent observer believes would have turned out 
differently if the losing candidate had spent more money than the winner.”363  
On the other hand, a completely regulated system is not a radical idea 
either. As Professor Richard Hasen has argued, the case for campaign finance 
reform is not limited to the election impact of campaign contributions.364 As 
Hasen explains, “[T]he retort that money does not buy elections ignores the 
access argument. . . . The money buys access, giving the contributor . . . a 
greater chance of gaining the ear of the politician to make an argument in 
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favor of the contributor’s position on legislation.”365 Reformers also contend 
that campaign finance deregulation undermines egalitarian principles of 
democracy by giving wealthy donors a larger voice in election campaigns than 
the poor and the middle class. 
Moreover, there is no doubt that the American public would support 
sweeping and restrictive campaign finance regulations.366 A September 2015 
poll found that nearly eight in ten Americans support overturning Citizens 
United, and almost 90% of Americans want new restrictions placed on the 
ability of the rich to influence election campaigns.367  
It’s not just the general public that wants greater regulation of campaign 
finance. Campaign contributors themselves are deeply critical of the system 
and strongly support comprehensive regulation.368 In the late 1990s, a group of 
political scientists conducted The Congressional Donors Survey to examine in 
detail the fundraising process from the perspective of campaign 
contributors.369 The survey found that 80% of donors reported being regularly 
pressured by officeholders to contribute money.370 Moreover, 57% of donors 
agreed that “[d]onors regularly pressure officials for favors.”371 The survey 
found broad support among donors for greater regulation of campaign finance. 
An astounding 74% of donors supported expenditure caps for congressional 
campaigns and 63% supported limits on television advertising by 
congressional candidates.372 The survey’s authors concluded, “It is striking 
that donors who make significant contributions to congressional candidates, as 
well as other types of candidates, party committees, and PACs are so critical 
of the campaign finance system.”373 
The Buckley decision prevented Congress and the country from finding 
out whether FECA’s expenditure caps would have created a better campaign 
finance system.374 However, our neighbor Canada provides an example of 
what might have happened in the United States if the Buckley ruling had come 
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out differently.375 Canada’s experience with comprehensive campaign 
regulation suggests that FECA’s expenditure caps might very well have 
worked. Indeed, contrary to the claims of Senator Buckley and other reform 
opponents, Canadian campaign finance law indicates that expenditure caps do 
not give incumbents an unfair advantage over challengers.  
A diverse and democratic nation of 36 million people located on 
America’s northern border, Canada shares many similarities with the United 
States.376 In 1974, the year Nixon resigned from office and Congress adopted 
the FECA amendments, Canada enacted the Election Expenses Act.377 The 
Act was adopted in part as a response to the Watergate scandal.378 As Minister 
of Parliament Terry O’Connor explained during the House of Commons 
debate on the election expenses reform bill, “We as politicians in this House, 
and our parties, have suffered vicariously from the tremendous lack of 
confidence and distrust inspired by the Watergate case in the American 
system.”379 The Canadian law, which established an expenditures cap on 
federal election spending for the express purpose of facilitating “a level 
playing field among candidates,”380 passed the House of Commons in January 
1974 by a vote of 174 to ten.381 
Four decades later, expenditure limits in Parliamentary elections remain in 
place today, as well as contribution limits, which Parliament added in 2003.382 
Under Canadian law, House of Commons candidates must abide by strict 
expenditure limits, the precise amount of which depends on the length of the 
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election period and the population of the riding, the Canadian equivalent of a 
congressional district.383 In the October 2015 federal elections, the expenditure 
limit for federal candidates ranged from a low of $170,000 for a riding in rural 
Prince Edward Island to a high of $279,000 for a riding in Kootenay, British 
Columbia.384 Although the average riding expense limit rose from $91,000 in 
the 2011 election to $219,000 in the 2015 election,385 it remained a fraction of 
the millions of dollars American Congressional candidates routinely spend 
every two years. Moreover, to further ease the fundraising burden on 
candidates, Canada provides generous publicly funded reimbursements of up 
to 60% of candidate expenditures.386  
The Canadian Election Expenses Act also imposes strict expenditure limits 
on political parties.387 The expenditure limit for each registered political party 
is determined by the length of the election period and the total number of 
ridings in which the party fields endorsed candidates.388 Some parties only 
compete in a few ridings while others compete in all 338 of Canada’s 
ridings.389 In 2015, the expenditure limit for the national parties that endorsed 
candidates in all 338 ridings was $54 million per party, with lower limits for 
parties competing in fewer ridings.390 Like candidates, political parties are 
eligible for publicly funded reimbursements of up to 50% of their campaign 
expenses.391 
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Crucially, Canada imposes strict expenditure limits not only on parties and 
candidates, but also on outside groups. Outside groups may air television 
advertisements before a federal election is officially called, and there are no 
spending limits on pre-election advertising.392 But once an election is called, 
Canadian law makes it illegal for outside groups not registered as a “third 
party” to air political ads during election campaigns.393 Under Canadian law, 
the term “third party” refers to outside groups that do not run candidates of 
their own, but nevertheless seek to engage in political advocacy during 
elections.394 Canada imposes severe restrictions on such groups. In the 2015 
election, 115 outside groups registered as third parties,395 many with names 
that echo American Super PACs, such as “We Love Canada,” “Voters for 
Honest Politicians,” and “Stand up for Canada.”396 The Canadian expenditure 
caps on outside groups are draconian. In the 2015 election, election advertising 
expenses by registered third parties were capped at $8,788 per electoral 
district, or $439,410 nationally.397 The caps are so low they essentially mean 
that there are no Super PAC-type ads during Canadian elections.398 
Moreover, in a striking departure from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Buckley 
ruling, the Canadian Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the expenditure 
caps.399 As Professor Daniel Tokaji notes, “The contrast between the 
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American and Canadian approaches to campaign finance regulation could not 
be more pronounced. Canada’s Supreme Court has embraced the egalitarian 
rationale for spending limits as decisively as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
rejected it.”400  
Yet, despite the expenditure limits, Canadians have fiercely competitive 
elections. Since Canada adopted expenditure caps, Canadian elections have 
seen far more incumbent turnover than American elections. For example, in 
the October 2015 general election, the Liberal Party went from third-place 
with only thirty-six seats in the House of Commons to 184 seats,401 an 
increase of 148 seats in the 338-seat parliamentary body.402 The Conservative 
Party dropped from 159 seats to ninety-nine seats, a decline of sixty seats.403 
The New Democratic Party also declined sharply, falling from ninety-five 
seats to forty-four, a fifty-one seat loss.404  
The 2015 election was not unique. Canadians also saw high levels of 
election turnover in 2011, 2006, 1993, and 1984.405 For example, in 2011, the 
Conservative Party gained twenty-three seats in the 308-seat House (the 
legislative body grew by thirty seats in 2015), the Liberal Party and the Bloc 
Quebecois both lost forty-three seats, and the New Democratic Party gained 
sixty-seven seats.406 Most remarkable of all, in 1993 the governing 
Conservatives were reduced from 169 seats in Parliament to two seats in a 
single election.407 In contrast, the United States Congress during the same time 
period consistently experienced reelection rates of 90% or more.408 
Thus, in sharp contrast to American congressional elections, incumbents 
are not safe in Canadian politics despite onerous campaign finance restrictions 
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that our Supreme Court has thus far never permitted Congress to establish in 
this country.409 As the Canadian experience demonstrates, competitive 
elections and high levels of incumbent turnover are possible even in a highly 
regulated campaign finance environment.410  
The bottom line is both regulation and deregulation can work. But what 
doesn’t work is the Supreme Court’s forty-year effort to have it both ways.411 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must either end the war on money in politics or 
give reformers the tools necessary to win that war. For the long-term health of 
our democracy, the Court cannot have it both ways any longer. It must choose 
once and for all a coherent and consistent campaign finance course for the 
nation to follow. 
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